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*  *  * 
MR.  CARSON:  Welcome  to  the  panel  on  U.S.  Copyright  Developments.  As  you 
will  see,  we  have  a  rather  eclectic  group  of  topics  that  have  no  discernible  relationship 
from  one  to  the  other,  but  that  should  make  for  an  interesting  panel.  If  you  don’t  like  what 
the  first  person  says,  just  wait  for  the  next  person  and  you’ll  find  something  you  find 
interesting. 
Our  first  speaker  is  Josh  Simmons,  from  Kirkland  &  Ellis,  who  will  talk  about 
copyright  and  dance  steps  and  some  cases  that  you  may  have  read  about  in  the  press.  He 
will  be  followed  by  Nick  Bartelt  of  the  Copyright  Office,  who  is  going  to  be  talking 
about  Copyright  Office  modernization.  Finally,  Ralph  Oman  of  The  George  Washington 
University  Law  School  will  talk  about  state  sovereign  immunity,  an  issue  with  which  he 
is  very  familiar  because  when  he  was  Register  of  Copyrights  he  was  responsible  for  a 
report  that  led  to  the  enactment  of  a  law  which  may  or  may  not  still  be  a  law;  it  probably 
isn’t,  but  we’ll  hear  about  that  from  Ralph. 
We  also  have  three  great  commenters:  Steve  Tepp  from  Sentinel  Worldwide;  Ann 
Bartow  of  the  University  of  New  Hampshire  School  of  Law;  and  Joe  Gratz  of  Durie 
Tangri  in  San  Francisco. 
Let’s  get  started,  Josh. 
MR.  SIMMONS:  As  David  mentioned,  you  may  have  seen  in  the  press  that  a 
number  of  cases  have  been  filed  in  the  last  several  months  involving  the  issue  of  dance 
steps  that  were  used  in  videogames.  We  are  representing  Take-Two  and  Epic  Games  in 
those  cases,  which  were  brought  by  a  series  of  different  plaintiffs  involving  different 
dance  steps  in  the  games  Fortnite  and  NBA  2K .  
What  is  interesting  about  the  cases  is  we  moved  to  dismiss,  saying,  “Dance  steps 
are  not  protectable,”  and  I’ll  explain  to  you  in  a  minute  why  we  think  that.  When  we 
moved,  we  were  fortunate  enough  to  have  —  and  I’m  going  to  connect  up  all  of  the 
panel’s  topics  —  the  Copyright  Office’s  thoughts  on  the  issue.  They  had  refused 
registration  of  the  dance  steps,  and  we  presented  that  to  the  courts. 
In  response  to  the  motion  to  dismiss  and  before  opposing  it,  the  other  side 
voluntarily  dismissed  the  cases,  saying  in  the  press  that  they  were  doing  so  because  the 
Fourth  Estate  decision  had  come  down  and  some  of  the  steps  had  been  registered  and  1
some  of  them  had  not  been  registered.  Regardless  of  whether  that  was  the  reason  that 
they  were  voluntarily  dismissed,  eight  of  those  cases  are  off  the  books,  at  least  for  the 
moment. 
The  ninth  case,  in  the  District  of  Maryland,  is  ongoing,  but  that  case,  which 
started  with  a  copyright  claim,  has  subsequently  dropped  the  copyright  claim.  So  we  have 
one  case  ongoing  that  involves  a  dance  step  issue  but  no  copyright  issue  live  at  the 
moment.  
The  press  reported  that  there  is  a  tenth  case  that  might  have  been  filed  yesterday, 
but  I  have  not  seen  that  complaint  yet,  so  I  can’t  speak  to  it. 
1  Fourth  Estate  Pub.  Benefit  Corp.  v.  Wall-Street.com,  LLC,  139  S.  Ct.  881  (2019). 
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In  any  case,  I  want  to  talk  about  the  copyrightability  issue  and  what  the 
Copyright  Office’s  views  were,  at  least  in  the  initial  refusals. 
Those  of  you  who  are  U.S.  copyright  lawyers  know  that  we  have  a  concept  called 
the  “words  and  short  phrases”  doctrine.  That  doctrine  has  been  adopted  by  the  courts  of 
appeal  in  pretty  much  every  circuit  that  has  considered  the  issue.  Basically,  what  they  say 
is  that  there  are  some  fundamental  building  blocks  of  creative  works  that  will  not  be 
protected  by  copyright,  the  idea  being  that  we  need  to  leave  open  some  space  to  allow  the 
creativity  of  authors  to  create  new  works. 
That  concept  came  from  the  Copyright  Office  originally,  which  had  been 
applying  that  doctrine  since  the  1800s,  but  in  the  1950s  passed  regulations  specifically 
saying  that  it  would  not  register  words  and  short  phrases  and  did  not  believe  that  they 
were  copyrightable.  That  regulation  is  what  most  of  the  circuit  courts  have  looked  to  as 
the  basis  for  their  understanding  that  words  and  short  phrases  are  not  protectable. 
What  about  dance  steps  and  simple  routines?  We  know  from  the  Copyright  Act 
that  Congress  intended  for  choreographic  works  to  be  protected.  Before  the  1976  Act, 
some  choreography  was  protectable  as  a  dramatic  work,  but  the  1976  Act  for  the  first 
time  protected  choreographic  works.  It  didn’t  provide  a  definition  of  what  a 
choreographic  work  is.  What  we  know  from  the  legislative  history  is  that  Congress  did 
not  think  that  it  included  “social  dance  steps  and  simple  routines,”  and  essentially  said, 
“And  everyone  knows  what  a  choreographic  work  is,  so  we  don’t  need  to  worry  about 
providing  a  definition.” 
The  Copyright  Office,  based  on  its  regulations  with  regard  to  words  and  short 
phrases,  has  adopted  in  the Compendium  rules  and  definitions  that  it  believes  are  helpful  
2
in  drawing  the  line  between  protectable  choreographic  works  and  unprotectable  dance 
steps  and  simple  routines.  The Compendium ,  quoting  the  Second  Circuit  in Horgan  v. 
Macmillan ,  which  was  in  turn  quoting  the  Copyright  Office Compendium ,  says  that  3
choreography  is  “the  composition  and  arrangement  of  ‘a  related  series  of  dance 
movements  and  patterns  organized  into  a  coherent  whole,’”  which  it  contrasts  with 
“individual  movements  or  dance  steps”  that  the  Copyright  Office  believes  are  not 
copyrightable.  Nor  does  it  believe  that  “short  dance  routines  consisting  of  only  a  few 
movements  or  steps  with  minor  linear  or  spatial  variations,  even  if  the  routine  is  novel  or 
distinctive”  are  protectable. 
In  our  petition  to  dismiss  our  case,  we  looked  at  this  legislative  history,  the  words 
and  short  phrases  doctrine,  and  the  dance  steps  at  issue  to  argue  that  they  were  not 
protectable. 
I’m  going  to  show  you  a  couple  of  the  dance  steps  because  that  makes  this  a  lot 
more  fun.  
The  first  case  involved  Alfonso  Ribeiro,  who  is  known  for  playing  the  character 
of  Carlton  in The  Fresh  Prince  of  Bel-Air .  He  alleged  that  he  had  created  this  dance  for 
The  Fresh  Prince  television  show,  so  our  first  argument  was,  “Well,  you  probably  don’t 
own  it  then,  because  most  actors  who  perform  in  a  television  show  give  their  rights  to  the 
producers.” 
2  U NITED  S TATES  COPYRIGHT  O FFICE ,  C OMPENDIUM  OF  U.S  C OPYRIGHT  P RACTICE  (3d  ed.  2017). 
3  Horgan  v.  Macmillan,  Inc.,  789  F.2d  157  (2d  Cir.  1986). 
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 Leaving  that  aside,  he  did  file  some  registrations,  not  from Fresh  Prince  but,  rather,  
from  his  subsequent  TV  appearances.  This  is  one  from The  Graham  Norton  Show ,  where 
you  can  see  him  swinging  his  arms  to  the  sides,  and  eventually  he’ll  make  this 
movement.  This  was  the  deposit  copy  submitted  to  the  Copyright  Office.  There’s  Graham 
Norton  jumping  in  the  middle. 
The  Copyright  Office  said:  “No,  this  is  not  protectable  because  it’s  ‘a  simple 
routine’  that  is  not  registrable  as  a  choreographic  work.  It’s  really  only  two  dance  moves, 
and  we  don’t  protect  ‘simple  dance  steps.’  If  you  had  had  a  longer  piece  of  choreography, 
we  could  talk  about  that.” 
He  tried  to  register  something  from Dancing  with  the  Stars ,  but  the  Copyright 
Office  said,  “Well,  again,  usually  the  choreographer  would  own  those  rights.  You  have 
this  little  dance  step  in  the  middle  of  a  larger  work.”  I  don’t  know  actually  what  his 
response  to  the  Copyright  Office  was  to  explain  why  he  thought  he  had  protection  there. 
The  second  work  involved  the  Backpack  Kid.  This  is  the  “floss”  dance.  This  is 
the  Backpack  Kid’s  deposit  copy  of  him  making  the  well-known  floss  movement  back 
and  forth.  First  of  all,  I’m  not  sure  that  the  Backpack  Kid  really  created  this  dance  step; 
but  leaving  that  aside,  the  Copyright  Office  also  found  this  was  not  protectable  because 
it’s  “a  single  dance  step.”  Again,  you  have  essentially  one  movement  of  his  arms  passing 
in  front  and  behind,  and  protecting  that  would  block  off  a  whole  lot  of  other  dance 
moves.  Martha  Graham,  for  example,  oftentimes  uses  the  same  kind  of  a  movement,  and 
that  could  be  problematic.  He  also  attempted  to  register  a  different  work  that  incorporated 
this  dance  step  into  more  steps,  and  we  can  talk  about  the  copyrightability  of  that. 
Terrence  Ferguson,  who  goes  by  2  Milly,  submitted  a  video  deposited  for  the 
movements  representing  “Milly  Rock  Dance.”  There  is  a  longer  version  of  this  video,  but 
the  only  step  that  was  at  issue  in  the  case  was  this  one.  Of  course,  we  were  moving  on 
substantial  similarity,  so  I  didn’t  have  to  argue  that  the  rest  of  the  dance  was  not 
copyrightable;  but  if  I  had,  the  Copyright  Office  would  have  held  that  the  entire  dance 
was  also  not  protectable  because  the  movements  represented  in  the  video  depict  a  simple 
routine  made  up  of  “social  dance  steps  and  do  not  represent  an  integrated,  coherent  and 
expressive  compositional  whole  and  is  thus  not  eligible  for  copyright  registration,”  in  part 
because  it  was  clearly  extemporaneous. 
I’m  going  to  show  you  one  more  dance,  which  is  the  Orange  Shirt  Kid.  This  is 
the  Orange  Shirt  Kid  dancing  in  his  bedroom.  This  dance,  first  of  all,  is  definitely  not  the 
dance  that’s  in Fortnite .  But  leaving  that  aside,  this  registration  actually  was  granted  by 
the  Copyright  Office.  
 I  say  that  with  a  footnote,  and  why?  The  registration  was  granted,  but  it  was  for  a  
motion  picture.  The  registering  attorney  learned  a  lesson  and  said,  “Oh,  choreographic 
work,  that’s  not  working;  let’s  file  as  a  motion  picture.”  
But  the  Copyright  Office  had  figured  out  what  was  going  on  in  the  case  and 
added  a  notation  to  the  registration  saying,  “This  registration  is  for  a  motion  picture.  It 
does  not  extend  to  individual  dance  steps,  social  dances,  or  simple  dance  routines.”  If  you 
did  not  learn  your  lesson,  you  cannot  get  around  the  registration  rules  by  trying  to  file  this 
as  a  motion  picture. 
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As  I  say,  we  may  not  know  what  happens  if  they  don’t  bring  the  copyright  claims 
back  into  the  cases,  but  for  now  this  is  the  first  time  in  a  long  time  we  have  had  to 
consider  the  copyrightability  of  dance. 
MR.  CARSON:  And  who  says  America  doesn’t  have  talent?  [Laughter] 
Does  anyone  care  to  take  up  the  cudgels  for  the  opposing  side  on  this  issue? 
Seriously,  would  anyone  in  the  audience  care  to  make  that  point,  or  are  we  all  in 
agreement  here? 
QUESTION:  I  have  a  quick  comment.  I’ve  seen  a  video  of  the  other  side  of  the 
argument.  When  you  see  the  two  videos  back  to  back  that  the  other  side  is  claiming,  it  is 
a  very  interesting  video.  I’ll  just  leave  it  there. 
MR.  SIMMONS:  That’s  an  interesting  point.  We  moved  on  lack  of  substantial 
similarity,  and  in  the  Ninth  Circuit  you  have  to  filter  out  unprotectable  elements. 
Therefore,  if  these  dance  steps  alone  are  not  protectable,  it  doesn’t  matter  if  they  are  close 
or  not  close.  I  would  argue  that  even  taking  them  as  they  are,  there  are  a  lot  of  differences 
between  them.  But  if  you  take  the  Copyright  Office  at  its  word,  then  you  don’t  even  have 
to  get  into  comparing  them  because  that  doesn’t  matter. 
MR.  CARSON:  You  don’t  have  the  images  from  the  game,  do  you? 
MR.  SIMMONS:  I  don’t.  I  only  had  seven  minutes.  Next  time  I  want  twelve 
minutes  and  I’ll  show  you  more. 
MR.  GRATZ:  The  material  here  is  pretty  simple,  but  there’s  lots  of  options  of 
how  to  put  the  steps  together,  what  movements  to  put  together.  Do  you  think  there  is  a 
higher  or  a  lower  level  of  aesthetic  choice  being  made  in  choosing  how  the  movements 
go  together  in How  to  Do  “the  Carlton”  or  in  selecting  the  name  of  a  Java  function, 
since,  Josh,  you  are  also  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  in  Oracle  v.  Google ?  4
MR.  SIMMONS:  I  think  these  cases  are  much  simpler.  If  you  think  of  it  as  the 
“language”  of  dance,  dance  steps  are  a  necessary  part  of  that  in  a  way  that  the  application 
programming  interface  (API)  declaring  code  in  the Oracle  case  is  not.  There  is  nothing  in 
that  API  that  needs  to  be  reused  because  it  is  the  combination  of  variable  names,  the 
names  of  the  functions,  a  variety  of  things  that  were  all  copied  verbatim;  there  are  a  lot  of 
different  elements  there.  Here  you  have  one  dance  step.  I  think  the  cases  are  really 
different. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  Do  you  have  a  theory  on  how  many  dance  steps  would  be 
required? 
MR.  SIMMONS:  Luckily,  I  don’t  have  to  because  we  don’t  have  that  case.  But 
you’d  imagine  —  the  purpose  of  the  choreographic  work  definition  was  to  bring  in  true 
dance,  true  choreography,  and  you  could  imagine  that  you  would  want  to  have  enough 
steps  to  really  file  it  as  a  choreographic  work,  not  as  something  that’s  a  social  dance. 
Otherwise,  what  you’d  end  up  with  is  if  you  were  dancing  at  a  club  or  a  wedding 
or  at  the  Fordham  IP  Conference  —  and  maybe  we’ll  force  everyone  to  dance  a  little  bit 
later  —  then  everyone  is  turned  into  an  infringer  automatically.  We  know  that  people  are 
doing  these  dance  steps  all  over  the  place  in  a  way  that  you  would  not  see  someone 
performing  a  Martha  Graham  routine  or  something  that  really  looked  more  like  a 
choreographic  work. 
4  Oracle  Am.,  Inc.  v.  Google  Inc.,  750  F.3d  1339  (Fed.  Cir.  2014). 
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MR.  CARSON:  Carlo,  you  had  a  comment? 
QUESTION  [Carlo  Lavizzari,  Lenz  Caemmerer,  Basel]:  My  sons  are  big  fans  of 
these  dance  movements.  But  that  is  not  my  question.  Did  you  look  into  sampling  cases, 
e.g.  music  sampling,  because  those  use  very  short,  distinctive  sequences? 
MR.  SIMMONS:  I  think  the  analogy  to  music  is  interesting.  But  there  you  would 
be  talking  about  individual  notes.  Even  a  short  amount  of  a  sound  recording  may  be 
enough  to  be  protectable,  but  here  you  are  talking  about  essentially  one  note  in  a  musical 
work.  I  don’t  think  there  has  been  a  sampling  case  that  has  held  that  one  single  note  by 
itself  would  be  protectable,  particularly  not  when  it  is  performed  differently. 
Remember,  in  the  sampling  cases  the  sound  recording  is  exactly  the  same.  Here, 
none  of  these  line  up  exactly  right.  Regardless  that  they  may  be  the  same  dance  step, 
there  are  differences  in  the  way  that  they  are  portrayed  in  the  games. 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Lavizzari]:  One  note  may  be  difficult,  but  the  first  four 
notes  of  Beethoven’s  Fifth  Symphony  — 
MR.  SIMMONS:  Public  domain.  I  don’t  have  to  answer  that  question.  [Laughter] 
QUESTION  [Richard  Pfohl,  Music  Canada,  Toronto]:  One  thing  that  is 
interesting  to  me  is  the  Copyright  Office  saying  that  “social  dance  steps”  are  not 
copyrightable.  I  wonder  if  that  is  getting  into  sort  of  a  formal  vs.  informal  distinction;  in 
other  words,  “We  privilege  Martha  Graham  as  choreography,  but  if  it  is  some  kids  doing 
the  Lindy  Hop,  then  that  is  just  ‘social  dancing’  so  we  will  not  allow  it  to  be  copyrighted. 
MR.  SIMMONS:  We  didn’t  move  on  the  social  dance  component  of  the  law.  But 
you  are  correct.  Congress  said,  as  you  saw  in  the  legislative  history,  that  social  dance  is 
not  part  of  the  definition  of  a  choreographic  work.  So  we  know  that  those  cannot  be 
protectable  based  on  what  Congress  said,  which  I  think  is  a  little  different  than  what  we 
normally  see  in  the  copyright  cases  where  we  are  concerned  about  the  highbrow/lowbrow 
distinction.  Here,  we  have  legislative  history  that  says,  “We  are  going  to  draw  certain 
distinctions  in  the  kinds  of  dance  —  the  broader  term  —  that  we  are  going  to  protect.” 
MR.  CARSON:  That  might  also  in  part  answer  your  question,  Carlo,  comparing 
it  to  music. 
MR.  SIMMONS:  I  said  I  would  connect  it  to  the  other  two  speeches,  so  we  did 
the  Copyright  Office  piece.  If  someone  in  state  government  starts  doing  these  dances,  the 
question  I  have  is,  is  that  going  to  be  a  sovereign  immunity  issue?  But  Ralph  will  address 
that  issue  in  a  couple  of  minutes.  [Laughter] 
PROF.  OMAN:  Beautiful,  beautiful. 
MR.  BARTELT:  Thanks,  Josh,  for  showing  how  much  fun  we  have  at  the 
Copyright  Office  and  the  wisdom  of  some  of  my  colleagues  in  making  their 
determinations  in  those  cases. 
MR.  CARSON:  All  right.  Time’s  up.  We  are  now  going  to  move  on  to  Nick’s 
presentation. 
MR.  BARTELT:  Thanks,  David.  Good  afternoon,  everyone.  Again,  I’m  Nick 
Bartelt.  I’m  here  from  the  Office  of  the  General  Counsel  at  the  U.S.  Copyright  Office  to 
talk  about  copyright  modernization  and  how  the  Office  is  working  to  tune  up  the  “Engine 
of  Free  Expression.” 
Briefly,  modernization  is  a  multi-year  process  that  requires  extensive 
collaboration  among  all  Copyright  Office  divisions  as  well  as  with  the  Library  of 
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Congress.  It  has  two  key  components:  (1)  transforming  all  of  the  Office’s  multiple  IT 
systems;  and  (2)  ensuring  that  non-IT  activities  are  efficient  and  aligned  with  the  Office’s 
strategic  goals. 
Before  I  get  into  how  the  Office  is  modernizing,  I  should  first  address  why 
modernization  matters.  
As  the  Supreme  Court  has  held  in Harper  &  Row  v.  Nation  and  later  in Eldred   
5 6
and  again  in Golan ,  and  which  the  Office  seized  upon  in  a  recently  announced  strategic  7
plan  for  2019–2023,  copyright  is  the  “Engine  of  Free  Expression.” 
In  practical  terms,  the  Office’s  core  services  of  registration,  recordation,  and 
statutory  licensing  are  integral  to  the  marketplace  transactions  in  the  United  States  and 
abroad.  They  provide  legal  certainty  for  licensing  works  to  new  businesses,  bring  U.S. 
content  to  foreign  countries,  and  ensure  public  access  to  copyright  ownership 
information. 
The  Office’s  copyright  records  fill  a  need  for  authoritative  rights  ownership 
information  when  contemplating  and  executing  transactions  as  well  as  in  litigating 
disputes. 
The  Office’s  registration  and  recordation  systems  also  constitute  the  world’s 
largest  compilation  of  copyrighted  works  and  copyright  ownership  information, 
encompassing  an  unparalleled  record  of  cultural  heritage. 
To  give  you  a  sense  of  the  scale,  in  Fiscal  Year  2018  the  Office  received  over 
540,000  new  claims  for  copyright,  registered  over  560,000  claims  covering  millions  of 
works,  and  recorded  over  21,000  documents  regarding  copyright  ownership.  This 
illustrates  both  why  it  is  so  important  and  so  challenging  to  modernize. 
Moreover,  in  a  post-formalities  world  where  registration  is  voluntary,  it  is 
incumbent  on  the  Copyright  Office  and  the  offices  from  around  the  world  to  incentivize 
these  activities,  in  part,  by  making  it  easier  for  owners  and  users  to  participate  in  the 
system. 
Last  fall,  the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization  and  the  Copyright  Office 
organized  a  meeting  of  experts  from  around  the  world  to  compare  different  national 
systems  and  discuss  the  challenges  and  common  goals  of  modernizing  systems  to 
maximize  value  to  the  creators  and  to  the  public.  Questions  asked  included:  What  might 
an  ideal  registration  system  look  like,  and  how  can  such  a  system  be  achieved  with  the 
limited  resources  of  national  copyright  offices? 
A  few  Office  goals  for  registration  and  recordation  are:  (1)  to  improve  user 
experience;  (2)  to  increase  office  efficiency;  and  (3)  to  decrease  processing  times. 
Our  users  expect  timely  service  and,  by  streamlining  and  coordinating  changes 
and  processes,  practices,  and  policies,  we  expect  to  realize  timely  and  reliable  service 
delivery  for  all  Office  services.  These  include  processing  copyright  registration 
applications,  responding  to  information  requests,  and  managing  copyright  deposits. 
How  specifically  do  we  plan  to  achieve  these  modernization  goals? 
5  Harper  &  Row,  Publishers,  Inc.  v.  Nation  Enters.,  471  U.S.  539,  558  (1985). 
6  Eldred  v.  Ashcroft,  537  U.S.  186,  219  (2003). 
7  Golan  v.  Holder,  565  U.S.  302,  132  S.  Ct.  873,  876,  181  L.  Ed.  2d  835  (2012). 
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As  I  said,  modernization  includes  but  also  goes  beyond  IT.  It  is  a  comprehensive 
undertaking  that  spans  the  entire  Copyright  Office.  Specifically,  the  Office  is  working  on 
carrying  out  a  number  of  major  efforts,  including: 
•  Developing  an  enterprise  copyright  system 
•  Reengineering  business  processes 
•  Allowing  comprehensive  access  to  public  records  
•  Developing  a  data  management  initiative 
•  Outreach  to  the  public  and  to  staff 
One  modernization  project  the  Office  is  working  on  is  the  Virtual  Card  Catalog. 
As  I  noted  previously,  the  U.S.  Copyright  Office  has  the  largest  collection  of  copyright 
records  in  the  world.  Members  of  the  public  seek  out  these  records  to  find  copyright 
owners  and  to  get  copies  of  completed  and  in-process  registration  records,  recordation 
documents,  and  registration  deposits. 
The  Office  is  transforming  its  historical  records  by  converting  the  extensive 
paper-based  pre-1978  entries  into  a  digital  format  for  improved  public  access,  enhanced 
online  search  capabilities,  and  continued  record  preservation.  In  March  the  Virtual  Card 
Catalog  added  more  than  24  million  card  images,  expanding  the  range  from  1870  to 
1977,  to  a  total  now  of  over  41  million  images. 
A  second  project  involves  modernizing  recordation.  Copyright  Office  staff  have 
begun  reengineering  the  paper-based  document  recordation  system  for  transfers  of 
copyright  ownership  and  other  documents  pertaining  to  copyright  under  17  U.S.C.  §  205, 
as  well  as  notices  of  termination  under  Sections  203  and  304(c)  and  (d).  We  are  currently 
in  the  process  of  developing  an  initial  limited  pilot  of  this  online  recordation  system. 
In  addition,  the  Office  has  already  begun  to  modernize  its  recordation 
regulations.  In  November  2017,  the  Office  issued  an  Interim  Rule  on  Recordation  that 
adopted  a  number  of  improvements,  including  that  electronically  signed  documents  can 
now  be  recorded,  expanding  the  universe  of  recordable  documents. 
On  the  registration  front,  the  Copyright  Registration  Modernization  Project  will 
create  a  system  replacing  and  improving  upon  the  current  electronic  copyright  system 
known  as  eCO.  Registration  goals,  as  with  recordation,  are  to  improve  user  experience, 
increase  office  efficiency,  and  decrease  processing  times. 
In  October  2018,  the  Office  published  a  Notice  of  Public  Inquiry  that  sought 
input  on  three  areas  of  reform:  (1)  the  administration  and  substance  of  the  application  for 
registration;  (2)  the  utility  of  the  public  record;  and  (3)  the  deposit  requirements  for 
registration. 
In  January  2019,  the  Office  received  fifty-four  comments  that  will  inform 
development  efforts  and  identify  other  potential  next  steps,  including  rule-makings  that 
can  benefit  users  even  before  the  next-generation  system  comes  online  As  I  mentioned, 
the  Office  is  already  modernizing  through  rule-makings.  Office  regulations  and 
registration  practice  have  taken  on  additional  significance  since  the  recent  Supreme  Court 
decision  in Fourth  Estate ,  which  requires  a  registration  determination  before  pursuing 
civil  infringement  claims  in  court.  Or  course,  registration  has  a  number  of  other  statutory 
benefits,  including: 
•  Create  a  searchable  public  record  of  the  copyright  claim; 
•  Establish  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  copyright’s  validity;  and 
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•  Allow  a  copyright  owner  to  claim  statutory  damages  and  attorney  fees  in 
infringement  suits. 
In  the  last  few  years  the  Office  has  promulgated  new  and  revised  rules  relating  to 
a  variety  of  registration  practices.  In  general,  these  rules  make  a  number  of  changes  to 
reflect  Office  practices,  promote  efficiency  of  the  registration  process,  and  encourage 
broader  participation  in  the  registration  system  by  reducing  the  burden  on  applicants. 
Many  of  the  rules  involve  moving  applications  online  and  allowing  digital  upload  of 
deposits. 
In  order  to  have  up-to-date  guidance  that  reflects  all  these  rules,  the  Office 
recently  released  a  revised  draft  of  the Compendium,  Third .  The Compendium  is  an 
administrative  manual  of  the  Register  of  Copyrights  concerning  the  Office’s  mandate  and 
statutory  duties  under  Title  17.  
In  addition  to  the  recent  rule-makings,  the  manual  has  been  updated  to  reflect  the 
Supreme  Court’s  decision  in Star  Athletica ,  and  the  final  version  will  also  be  updated  to  8
reflect  the  Supreme  Court’s  recent  decision  in  Fourth  Estate .  9
The Compendium  has  also  been  updated  to  reflect  certain  practice  changes  that 
have  been  implemented  by  the  Office  of  Registration  Policy  and  Practice.  Among  other 
changes,  the  public  draft  clarifies  how  and  when  the  Office  will  communicate  with 
applicants,  when  it  will  attempt  to  correct  deficiencies  in  the  application,  when  it  will 
register  a  claim  with  an  annotation,  and  when  it  will  refuse  registration. 
Finally,  just  to  stay  current  on  Office  modernization,  I  commend  to  you  the 
dedicated  webpage,  which  has  monthly  quick-fact  updates.  
In  addition,  the  Office  launched  a  bimonthly  webinar  series  with  the  next 
installment  coming  in  May,  and  archived  webinars  available  soon. 
Thank  you  for  your  time.  I  look  forward  to  hearing  from  the  panel  and  the 
audience.  Because  I  am  still  technically  in  my  probationary  period  with  the  Office,  you’ll 
excuse  me  if  I  answer  questions  a  little  unartfully  or  I  am  to  offer  guidance  where  we 
haven’t  taken  a  position  yet. 
MR.  CARSON:  You  had  a  slide  that  showed  the  old  eCO  system  and  a  mockup 
of  the  new  system.  Can  you  tell  us  a  little  more  about  how  the  new  system  is  going  to 
look  and  how  much  more  useful  (hopefully)  it  will  be  for  people  to  interact  with? 
MR.  BARTELT:  It’s  a  work  in  progress,  right?  I  think  we  are  trying  to  take  this 
in  steps.  The  pilot  that  we  are  working  on  right  now  is  focused  more  on  recordation.  I 
would  say  that  the  registration  portal  is  still  really  under  development.  I  haven’t  seen  a  lot 
of  it,  other  than  what  I  was  able  to  show  on  the  slide,  but  we  are  trying  to  get  a  lot  of 
public  feedback,  a  lot  of  user  testing,  particularly  from  people  who  are  finding  the  current 
system  challenging,  and  use  that  input  in  order  to  develop  a  system  that  will  be  more 
workable  for  people.  Unfortunately,  I  don’t  know  the  specifics  of  how  it’s  looking,  but  I 
do  know  we’re  doing  a  lot  of  user  outreach  I  know  on  the  recordation  side,  and  we  plan 
to  do  the  same  for  registration. 
MR.  CARSON:  Speaking  of  public  feedback,  this  may  be  an  opportunity  for 
some  informal  input. 
8  Star  Athletica,  L.L.C.  v.  Varsity  Brands,  Inc.,  137  S.  Ct.  1002  (2017). 
9Fourth  Estate  Pub.  Benefit  Corp.  v.  Wall-Street.com,  LLC,  139  S.  Ct.  881  (2019).    
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QUESTION  [Shlomit  Yanisky-Ravid,  ONO  Academic  College]:  Congratulations 
on  your  new  job. 
My  question,  as  you  can  guess,  is  about  blockchain.  I  know  some  registration 
copyright  systems  —  and  in  Europe  they  have  some  company  that  I’m  indirectly 
affiliated  with  —  are  thinking  that  blockchain  as  a  well–encrypted,  peer-to-peer, 
democratic  system  can  maybe  replace  the  current  registration  system;  or  could  possibly 
just  assist.  I  don’t  know.  What’s  your  take  on  that? 
MR.  BARTELT:  I  have  seen  some  of  the  blockchain  solutions  that  are  being 
offered  in  the  private  sector.  I  think  the  Office  would  feel  those  solutions  do  not  offer  the 
same  benefits  as  registration.  We’ve  offered  this  exchange  where  we  review  for 
copyrightability;  we  are  creating  this  authoritative  public  record.  As  I  mentioned,  there 
are  benefits  beyond  just  creating  a  record.  The  blockchain  solutions  are  essentially  the 
modernized  version  of  “mailing  it  to  yourself  in  a  stamped  envelope  on  this  date.” 
I  think  these  solutions  potentially  have  some  value  for  evidentiary  purposes 
solutions.  I  don’t  know  if  users  have  been  successful  in  bringing  claims.  But  certainly,  I 
think  the  registration  system,  particularly  once  it  is  modernized,  will  have  hopefully  more 
value.  I  don’t  know  that  we’re  considering  blockchain  as  part  of  the  development,  but  I 
do  know  that  they  are  trying  to  modernize  the  technology,  so  perhaps  in  the  development 
blockchain  will  be  considered 
QUESTION  [Mark  Seeley,  Board  of  Directors,  Copyright  Clearance  Center]:  The 
question  that  I  pose  for  you  is  really  about  the  question  of  chain  of  title.  In  my  prior 
career,  having  done  a  few  M&A  deals  in  publishing  over  a  few  decades,  frankly  the 
records  are  a  mess,  and  the  prior  holders  haven’t  recorded  changes  in  title. 
The  one  thing  that  we  do  know  is  that  there  are  collective  management 
organizations,  organizations  like  EBSCO  on  the  journal  side  as  a  distributor  of  content, 
that  do  have  a  fair  amount  of  current  information  that  connects  rightholders  with  works.  I 
wonder  whether  the  Copyright  Office  is  thinking  about  looking  at  some  of  those 
resources  as  a  way  of  sort  of  filling  in  some  of  the  details. 
The  problem  will  be  that  you  will  never  be  able  to  totally  correct  some  of  the  old 
in-firm  changes  of  title,  but  perhaps  there  might  be  some  consideration  around  some  type 
of  claiming  process,  with  notice  so  that  people  could  object  to  it  if  they  wished  to,  that 
looks  at  current  information  about  rightholders. 
MR.  BARTELT:  Are  you  suggesting  that  we  ingest  information  from  existing 
systems  and  then  have  people  be  able  to  confirm  it?  
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Seeley]:  Yes. 
MR.  BARTELT:  That’s  an  interesting  idea.  I  don’t  know  that  it  is  one  that  we 
have  considered.  The  focus  as  far  as  modernizing  the  recordation  system  has  been 
primarily  on  incentivizing  people  to  use  it  more  and  make  it  more  accessible,  increase 
processing  times  in  order  to  have  the  record  going  forward  be  more  reliable,  robust,  fill  in 
the  gaps  of  chain  in  title.  But  looking  backward  is  a  welcome  suggestion. 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Seeley]:  Good.  Okay. 
MR.  CARSON:  To  do  that  would  definitely  require  some  changes  in  the  statute 
because  the  way  recordation  works  now  is  they  actually  have  to  get  the  document,  or  at 
least  a  copy  of  the  document,  of  transfer  with  the  signature,  which  is  different,  for 
example,  from  how  transfers  are  recorded  at  the  Patent  and  Trademark  Office.  There  is 
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perhaps  some  justification  for  that  system.  If  you’ve  got  the  actual  document,  then  you 
can  be  reasonably  certain  that,  unless  someone  forged  it,  it  is  the  actual  document.  It  has 
someone  saying,  “I  got  the  assignment.”  But  it’s  a  clunky  system  to  administer. 
MR.  BARTELT:  I  think  that’s  right,  David.  We  rely  on  the  certifications  of  the 
remitters  to  say,  “I  am  who  I  say  I  am  and  this  document  is  a  true  and  correct  copy.”  
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Seeley]:  The  problem  with  broken  chain  titles  is  you 
wouldn’t  be  able  to  get  them.  You’d  be  able  to  get  somebody  who  says,  “I  bought  that 
publishing  business  which  had  those  assets,”  but  you  wouldn’t  be  able  to  get  the  prior 
owner  to  correct  the  chain  title. 
MR.  CARSON:  I  know  we’re  over  time,  but  we  have  a  couple  of  panelists  who 
want  to  talk  and  we’re  going  to  let  them  talk.  Steve? 
MR.  TEPP:  Everyone  agrees  it’s  obvious  that  the  technology  that  the  Copyright 
Office  has  at  its  disposal  is  insufficient,  so  modernization  is  a  no-brainer. 
The  point  I  want  to  make  is  that  modernization  should  be  more  than  just  taking 
the  current  system  and  putting  it  online  or  making  it  electronic.  When  Congress  chose  in 
the  1980s  to  retain  a  domestic  facing  formality  between  U.S.  rightholders  and  the  ability 
to  enforce  their  copyright,  I  think  it’s  fair  to  say  that  they  created  some  sort  of  obligation 
to  make  the  registration  system  feasible  for  all  authors. 
We  touched  on  this  yesterday  morning.  For  photographers,  for  other  graphic 
artists,  for  fine  artists,  there  are  a  lot  of  aspects  of  the  registration  system  that  are  not 
feasible.  
The  published  vs.  unpublished  distinction  —  granted  you  could  say  that’s 
required  by  the  statute,  and  maybe  we  need  to  revise  the  statute,  because  a  lot  of  authors 
don’t  know  when  they  have  given  photographs,  for  example,  over  to  clients,  did  they 
publish  it?  Who  knows?  And  is  your  registration  then  defective  if  you  falsely  identify 
that? 
Obviously,  there  is  a  question  about  fees,  particularly  with  some  proposals  that 
are  out  there.  I’m  hopeful  that  the  numbers  we  have  seen  are  not  going  to  be  where  they 
go;  but  if  they  did,  it  becomes  burdensome,  to  say  the  least. 
The  “best  edition  copy”  requirement  is  something  that  does  not  serve  the 
Copyright  Office’s  needs  as  an  office  of  record,  but  it  is  really  more  about  the  Library  of 
Congress’s  desires  for  preservation.  
I  think  all  of  these  things  and  more  need  to  be  looked  at  and  revised  to  make  the 
registration  system  more  accessible  feasibly  to  the  rightholders  whose  rights  are 
conditioned  on  it. 
My  final  point  is  —  and  this  goes  to  both  the  questions  that  have  already  been 
asked  —  the  most  pivotal  thing  that  I  urge  everyone  to  remember  is  the  Copyright  Office 
will  not  make  these  decisions.  The  Register  of  Copyrights,  Karyn  Temple,  who  we  heard 
from  yesterday,  does  not  have  the  authority  to  make  decisions  about  Copyright  Office 
modernization;  the  Librarian  of  Congress  does,  and  that’s  who  these  questions  and 
concerns  need  to  be  addressed  to  directly.  Carla  Hayden  and  her  Chief  IT  Officer  Bud 
Barton  will  be  making  these  decisions  in  consultation  with  the  Copyright  Office. 
Hopefully  they  are  listening  to  the  Copyright  Office  and  listening  to  all  the  comments 
people  have  sent  to  the  Copyright  Office,  but  at  the  moment  we  don’t  know. 
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MR.  CARSON:  And  some  of  those  decisions  may  require  changes  in  the  statute, 
which  means  it’s  up  to  Congress;  and  most  of  those  decisions  will  require  money,  which 
is  definitely  up  to  Congress.  So,  yes,  it’s  not  all  in  the  Copyright  Office’s  hands. 
MR.  BARTELT:  I  do  think  we  try  to  be  mindful  of  the  fees.  There  was  a  good 
point  raised  yesterday  about  the  fact  that  we  are  cognizant  of  the  unique  issues  that 
photographers  encounter  in  trying  to  register  their  works  and  we  are  trying  to  strike  that 
balance.  Even  with  the  fees  being  what  they  are,  we  are  not  a  self-funding  operation,  we 
require  appropriations,  and  our  fees  don’t  even  meet  what  the  costs  of  doing  these 
registrations  are  currently.  
MR.  CARSON:  I  know  there  are  other  questions,  but  we’ve  got  thirty  minutes 
after  the  last  presentation  and  we’ll  have  time  to  come  back  to  you. 
Ralph? 
PROF.  OMAN:  To  conclude  —  [Laughter] 
MR.  CARSON:  Any  comments  or  questions? 
PROF.  OMAN:  I’m  here  to  talk  about  state  sovereign  immunity  for  copyright 
infringement,  one  of  the  lingering  issues  in  the  copyright  portfolio.  
The  problem  is,  as  all  of  you  know,  the  Eleventh  Amendment  of  the  United 
States  Constitution.  In  most  cases  the  Eleventh  Amendment  prohibits  lawsuits  against 
states  in  their  own  name  or  against  state  entities,  like  prison  systems  or  universities,  and  it 
prevents  suits  against  them  in  federal  court  in  most  cases.  That  means  that  if  a  state 
university  makes  a  digital  copy  of  your  book  of  photographs  and  sends  100,000  copies  to 
all  of  its  faithful  alumni  —  destroying  your  potential  market,  since  the  book  of 
photographs  featured  the  university  —  you  cannot  sue  the  university  for  copyright 
infringement  and  expect  to  get  monetary  damages. 
Congress  thought  it  had  solved  the  problem  back  in  1990  when  it  enacted  the 
Copyright  Remedy  Clarification  Act  (CRCA).  Relying  on  its  Article  I  powers,  Congress  10
thought  it  made  clear  that  states  could  be  sued  for  copyright  infringement. 
The  Supreme  Court  ultimately  held  in  a  related  case, Seminole  Tribe ,  and  11
another  case  involving  other  intellectual  property, Florida  Prepaid ,  that  Congress  12
cannot  use  Article  I  to  abrogate  state  sovereign  immunity.  The  Eleventh  Amendment  was 
adopted  after  the  1788  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  so  it  trumps  Article  I. 
Circuit  courts  over  the  years  have  deemed  the  CRCA  abrogation  constitutionally 
flawed  and  have  dismissed  copyright  suits  in  these  areas,  with  implications  for  copyright, 
the  most  famous  being,  I  think,  the Chavez  case  out  West,  and  most  recent  cases  have  
13
followed  suit. 
There  is  a  case  that  is  now  pending  before  the  Supreme  Court  —  we’re  waiting 
for  a  decision  on  whether  it  will  grant certiorari  — Allen  v.  Cooper ,  a  case  out  of  the 
Fourth  Circuit,  that  raises  the  issues  of  state  sovereign  immunity  in  copyright  cases.  I   14
10  Copyright  Remedy  Clarification  Act  of  1990,  Pub.  L.  No.  101-887,  104  Stat.  2749 
(1990). 
11  Seminole  Tribe  of  Fla.  v.  Fla.,  517  U.S.  44  (1996). 
12  Fla.  Prepaid  Postsecondary  Educ.  Expense  Bd.  v.  Coll.  Sav.  Bank,  527  U.S.  627  (1999). 
13  Chavez  v.  Arte  Publico  Press,  204  F.3d  601  (5th  Cir.  2000). 
14  Allen  v.  Cooper,  895  F.3d  337  (4th  Cir.  2018). 
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won’t  get  into  the  details.  We’ll  find  out  very  soon  —  it  could  be  next  week  actually  — 
whether  or  not  the  Court  grants  cert . 
Many  experts  —  many  of  whom  are  here  today  —  say  that  the  Court  won’t  take 
the  case.  They  say  that  the  Court  thinks  that  it  has  already  given  us  sufficient  guidance  in 
this  area  with Seminole  Tribe  and Florida  Prepaid  and  nothing  more  has  to  be  said, 
which  would  argue  against  the  Court  taking cert .  But  others  say  that  new  evidence  that 
has  been  produced  in  a  related  case  suggests  that  the  state  infringement  problem  has 
grown  steadily  worse  since  1990  and  that  this  evidence  vindicates  the  congressional 
finding  and  the  congressional  rationale  in  adopting  the  CRCA.  We’ll  see. 
The  other  alternative  is  one  that  I  raise  with  some  caution,  seeking  legislation  that 
would  correct  the  problem  once  and  for  all  by  following  the  roadmap  that  the  Court  gave 
us  in Florida  Prepaid  and  the Seminole  Tribe  cases  and  that  the  Fourth  Circuit  gave  us 
more  recently  in  Allen  v.  Cooper . 
Some  experts  with  a  lot  of  experience  in  the  field  point  to  strong,  even 
compelling,  evidence  that  shows  that  the  states  and  state  entities  have  grown  in  many 
ways  indifferent  to  their  responsibilities  and  obligations  to  protect  copyright,  thinking 
that  the  Eleventh  Amendment  has  given  them  a  bulletproof  defense  against  liability. 
This  evidence  that  has  been  accumulated  suggests  that  there  have  been  over  165 
cases  of  direct  copyright  infringement  by  states  or  state  entities  in  the  past  twenty  or  so 
years.  The  states  are  engaged  in  willful  copyright  infringement.  Those  figures  must  be,  in 
my  opinion,  just  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  Most  infringement  suits  are  almost  certainly 
abandoned  after  the  author  talks  to  a  lawyer  and  discovers  that  there  is  no  chance  of 
getting  damages  for  the  blatant  infringement  and  that  in  most  cases  a  lawsuit  would  be  a 
waste  of  time  and  money. 
In  view  of  that  new  evidence,  Congress  could  switch  its  focus  from  Article  I  to 
Section  5  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  and  that  would  solve  the  constitutional  problem 
if  the  evidence  were  compelling  enough.  That  is  the  problem  with  a  legislative  fix. 
I  recognize,  and  I  think  most  people  recognize,  that  copyright  is  property.  The 
Fourteenth  Amendment  allows  Congress  to  intervene  legislatively  if  evidence  suggests 
that  the  states  have  deliberately,  repeatedly,  and  intentionally  deprived  people  of  their 
rights  or  property  without  due  process  of  law.  
I  am  convinced  that  Congress  could  find  that  evidence  persuasive  and  enact  a 
revised  CRCA  based  on  Section  5.  Of  course,  ultimately  the  courts  would  have  to  decide 
whether  or  not  that  is  an  offense  that  rises  to  the  constitutional  level,  but  that’s  an  issue 
for  another  day. 
Thank  you  very  much. 
MR.  CARSON:  Thank  you,  Ralph.  
Steve,  I  know  that  from  having  worked  with  you  on  this  issue  many,  many  years 
ago  —  
MR.  TEPP:  About  twenty. 
MR.  CARSON:  —  that  you’ve  got  great  interest  in  this  case  and  a  great  deal  of 
sympathy  for  Ralph’s  ultimate  viewpoint.  What’s  your  evaluation  of  the  strength  of  the 
case  right  now? 
MR.  TEPP:  I’ll  start  by  patting  us  both  on  the  back.  The  General  Accounting 
Office  was  asked  to  do  a  study  of  this  issue  after  the  1999  Supreme  Court  decisions. 
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By  the  way,  there  are  two Florida  Prepaid  decisions  with  opposite  captions,  15
with  the  defendant  and  the  plaintiff  trading  spots,  that  were  issued  on  the  same  day  as 
Alden  v.  Maine ,  which  is  the  philosophical  underlying  rationale  for  the  notion  of  state  16
sovereign  immunity  actually  being  broader  than  is  articulated  in  the  Eleventh 
Amendment.  It’s  Justice  Scalia  and  then-Chief  Justice  Rehnquist  who  were  really 
partnering  in  this  trio  of  decisions. 
At  the  end  of  the  GAO  report ,  the  Copyright  Office  and  USPTO  were  invited  to 17
submit  letters  stating  their  views.  What  we  wrote  at  the  time  was,  “While  it  will  take 
some  time  for  states  to  digest  this,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  without 
accountability  there  will  not  be  responsibility”  and  “we  anticipate  as  time  goes  by  this 
problem  will  increase”—  and,  sure  enough,  it  has.  This  could  hardly  be  a  surprise. 
I  very  much  hope  the  Court  takes  this  case  and  reverses  the  decisions  from  1999. 
I’m  concerned  that  they  won’t.  Those  decisions  are  only  twenty  years  old  and  they  were 
pretty  strong  decisions.  Of  course,  neither  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist  nor  Justice  Scalia  are 
alive,  much  less  on  the  Court. 
If  it  does  come  to  trying  legislation  again,  the  bar  that  was  set  in  those  decisions 
is  so  unreasonably  high  —  it’s  something  on  the  order  of  “if  your  nation  has  fought  a 
civil  war  over  this  issue,  you  can  abrogate  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment”  or 
something  close  to  that  —  so  I’d  be  concerned  about  just  reenacting  the  CRCA.  Maybe  a 
new  Court  would  see  it  differently  and  would  at  least  apply  a  more  reasonable  threshold. 
The  other  possibility  that  I  want  to  reintroduce  is  something  that  we  worked  very 
hard  on  at  the  time,  which  was  legislation  that  would  have  denied  federal  copyright 
protection  —  and  patent  and  trademark  protection,  for  that  matter  —  to  states  and  state 
instrumentalities  unless  those  states  waived  their  immunity  from  suit  for  infringements  of 
the  various  disciplines  of  IP.  I  think  that  was  particularly  well-balanced  and  quite 
reasonable.  Some  states  have  waived  and  some  states  have  sort  of  a  “Hell  no,  we  will 
never  waive”  policy. 
That  legislation  was  humming  along  nicely  right  up  until  the  National 
Association  of  Attorneys  General  found  out  about  it  and  contacted  the  U.S.  senators  from 
their  respective  states,  and  then  that  was  it  for  that  legislation.  
So  there  is  that  political  landmine  still,  but  if  it  comes  to  it,  it’s  worth  another 
shot  because  this  is  just  injustice  allowed  by  a  Supreme  Court  ruling. 
MR.  CARSON:  Ann,  you  work  for  the  University  of  New  Hampshire  —  
PROF.  BARTOW:  I  do. 
MR.  CARSON:  —  which  I  believe  is  a  beneficiary  of  state  sovereign  immunity. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  I  generally  seek  sovereign  immunity  every  day.  [Laughter]  I 
can  come  back  to  that  if  you’re  interested. 
15  Fla.  Prepaid  Postsecondary  Educ.  Expense  Bd.  v.  Coll.  Sav.  Bank,  527  U.S.  627 
(1999);  College  Sav.  Bank  v.  Florida  Prepaid  Postsecondary  Educ.  Expense  Bd,  527  U.S.  666 
(1999).   
16  Alden  v.  Maine,  527  U.S.  706  (1999). 
17United  States  General  Accounting  Office,  Report  to  the  Honorable  Orrin  G.  Hatch, 
Ranking  Minority  Member,  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  U.S.  Senate  (Sept.  2001), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232603.pdf. 
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Actually,  I  have  a  question,  though.  Presumably  since  1999  the  folks  whose 
works  are  getting  infringed  by  the  state  actors  are  trying  things  in  state  courts,  right? 
They  must  be  trying  unfair  competition.  There  are  some  different  theories  you  could 
come  up  with  that  are  sort  of  copyright-like  in  state  law.  I  don’t  know.  Has  that  been 
something  that  has  gotten  any  traction? 
PROF.  OMAN:  That  issue  came  up  in  a  case  in  Texas  that  is  still  pending 
actually  involving  Texas  A&M  University,  and  there  was  that  question  of  the  availability 
of  state  remedy.  The  state  attorney  general  indicated  that  this  would  not  be  actionable 
under  state  law  in  state  court,  and  that  avenue  was  foreclosed. 
Another  fact  that  is  relevant  is  that  there  could  be  some  other  theory,  I  suppose, 
of  legal  liability,  but  the  federal  law  in  copyright  is  very  clear  that  copyright  is  the 
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  federal  courts,  thank  you  very  much. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  The  states  have  no  way  to  protect  their  citizens  from 
themselves. 
MR.  CARSON:  Ralph,  you  mentioned,  and  maybe  you  can  flesh  this  out  a  bit, 
that  there  have  been  165  cases  of  direct  copyright  infringement  by  the  states.  That’s  since 
when? 
PROF.  OMAN:  Since  1990. 
MR.  CARSON:  Okay.  Do  you  know  how  many  of  those  cases  are  cases  in  which 
the  copyright  owners  have  tried  to  pursue  some  remedy  under  state  law? 
PROF.  OMAN:  I  don’t  have  that  figure. 
MR.  CARSON:  In  order  to  satisfy  the  high  test  the  Court  has  set,  would  you 
actually  have  to  have  a  record  of  copyright  owners  having  made  that  attempt  and  failed? 
PROF.  OMAN:  The  assumption  by  the  party  that  compiled  the  list  was  that  if 
they  filed  in  a  federal  court,  they  had  either  exhausted  their  state  remedies  or  deemed 
them  not  useful  to  their  case. 
MR.  CARSON:  I  don’t  want  to  put  you  on  the  spot,  Ann,  so  feel  free  not  to 
answer.  But  as  someone  who  is  at  least  indirectly  involved  in  the  history  of  this,  I’m 
wondering  if  —  you  may  not  care  to  justify  the  whole  doctrine. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  It’s  interesting.  On  the  other  side  of  things,  I  can’t  help 
thinking  about  Georgia’s  project  with  online  reserves,  the  legacy  of  L.  Ray  Patterson,  to 
try  to  make  sure  that  libraries  have  the  same  sort  of  ability  to  put  electronic  works  on 
reserve  that  exists  for  paper  books.  I’m  old  enough  that  I  grew  up  with  paper  books  on 
reserve.  His  battle  and  the  state  fighting  that  at  the  same  time  is  sort  of  interesting  to  me. 
They  are  hoping  for  a  pretty  broad  scope  of  fair  use  at  the  same  time  as  they  are  saying 
that  potentially  they  don’t  need  to  worry  about  it  at  all. 
MR.  TEPP:  Shouldn’t  that  be  battled  out  under  the  fair  use  doctrine  and  not  have 
that  entire  case  preempted? 
PROF.  BARTOW:  You  don’t  have  to  convince  me.  I’m  with  you  on  that.  I’m 
completely  with  you  on  that. 
It’s  certainly  not  the  policy  of  the  University  of  New  Hampshire  School  of  Law 
or  any  part  of  the  university  to  disrespect  intellectual  property.  We  used  to  be  Franklin 
Pierce  Law  School,  and  the  mission  of  the  early  school  was  to  protect  intellectual 
property. 
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I  personally  wouldn’t  want  to  get  —  I  know  copyright,  so  I  guess  it’s  okay  —  in 
trouble  with  my  university  and  be  in  a  defensive  position,  I  guess,  if  someone  was 
complaining.  I  think  there  are  still  things  that  you  can  do  to  get  attention  if  your  works 
are  being  abused.  The  media  and  making  trouble  for  the  individuals  responsible  might 
have  an  effect.  I  don’t  know. 
MR.  GRATZ:  Thinking  about  the  proposal  to  condition  the  exercise  of  federal  IP 
rights  on  waiver,  I  can  only  imagine  the  internal  struggle  that  would  occur  within  large 
state  universities  as  between  the  technology  transfer  world  and  the  library  and  academic 
world.  The  answer  might  be  very  different  as  to  who  ends  up  having  the  political  power 
to  control  that  decision. 
I  went  to  the  University  of  Wisconsin,  where  the  Wisconsin  Alumni  Research 
Foundation  originally  owned  the  patents  on  vitamins  and  has  been  doing  this  for  a  long 
time,  such  that  I  think  their  level  of  clout  might  lead  to  a  different  decision  than  might  be 
the  case  in  some  other  places. 
MR.  TEPP:  That  was  the  idea.  And  don’t  forget  college  mascots. 
MR.  CARSON:  Indeed.  I  gather,  Steve,  the  proposal,  which  I  have  a  vague 
recollection  of,  was  that  it  would  have  been  for  IP  across  the  board.  In  other  words,  not 
only  would  you  have  to  waive  for  copyright  if  you  want  to  assert  copyright,  but  you’d 
have  to  waive  basically  all  federal  IP  rights.  
MR.  TEPP:  Waive  immunity  for  infringement  of  all  IP  disciplines,  and  then 
you’d  get  into  eligibility  for  protection  under  federal  law. 
MR.  CARSON:  Right,  right.  I’m  curious.  Would  anyone  care  to  justify  at  a 
policy  level  the  fact  that  states  do  enjoy  this  level  of  sovereign  immunity? 
[No  response] 
Somehow  I  didn’t  think  so. 
I’d  be  curious  to  know  —  we  have  a  lot  of  foreign  visitors  —  do  you  have  similar 
doctrines  in  any  of  your  countries?  Here  in  the  United  States  it’s  rather  complicated 
because  we  have  a  federal  system  where  it’s  the  states  who  enjoy  immunity.  The  federal 
government  enjoys  limited  immunity;  you  can’t  enjoin  it.  
MR.  TEPP:  Because  we  waived  it. 
MR.  CARSON:  I  was  about  to  get  that.  Yes,  there  is  a  statute  which  provides  that 
you  can  sue  the  federal  government  for  copyright  infringement;  you  can  get  damages  but 
you  cannot  get  injunctive  relief. 
I’m  curious  whether  at  the  national  level  or  in  countries  that  do  have  federal 
systems  at  the  state  level,  is  there  any  such  phenomenon  in  other  countries?  Carlo. 
PARTICIPANT  [Mr.  Lavizzari]:  There  are  limitations  for  sort  of  innocent 
infringement  and  relief  under  Section  301,  sort  of  combinations  of  foreign  countries.  I’ve 
always  wondered  what  the  United  States  would  do  if  Nigeria  said,  “Well,  we  now  have 
state  immunity  and  you  can’t  sue  any  of  our  states.”  I  think  the  United  States  would  never 
accept  this  from  any  other  country. 
MR.  CARSON:  You  think  it  works  both  ways?  [Laughter] 
PARTICIPANT  [Mr.  Lavizzari]:  I  didn’t  say  that. 
MR.  CARSON:  Thank  God!  Okay.  Good.  
Fiona? 
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PARTICIPANT  [Fiona  Phillips,  Fiona  Phillips  Law,  Sydney]:  In  Australia  we 
have  Crown  immunity,  but  it  doesn’t  apply  so  broadly.  What  we  do  have  is  our  famous 
statutory  licenses.  There  is  a  statutory  license  for  government  use,  so  as  long  as  you  are 
doing  something  for  the  services  of  the  Crown  (because  Australia  is  still  a  monarchy), 
then  that  is  okay,  and  you  can  sort  it  out  and  pay  your  equitable  remuneration  after  the 
fact.  So  it  is  very  broad. 
At  one  stage  of  my  career,  I  was  an  inhouse  lawyer  at  the  competition  regulator, 
and  the  competition  regulator  had  very  broad  discovery  powers  for  compelling  regulated 
industries  to  provide  information,  and  sometimes  they  would  put  up  copyright  claims  to 
defend  that.  Those  claims  were  preempted  by  the  fact  that  as  long  as  it’s  for  government 
use  it’s  okay. 
MR.  CARSON:  But  at  least  there  is  compensation. 
PARTICIPANT  [Ms.  Phillips]:  Yes,  there  is  compensation,  but  basically  you 
can’t  get  in  the  way  of  the  machinery  of  government.  It  doesn’t  apply  to  the  universities, 
though. 
MR.  CARSON:  Anyone  else? 
MR.  SIMMONS:  One  of  the  interesting  things  about  the  possibility  of  this  case 
coming  back  up  to  the  Supreme  Court  is  that Florida  Prepaid  and  the  other  Supreme 
Court  cases  basically  said  that  Congress  hadn’t  done  enough  legwork,  that  there  wasn’t 
enough  evidence  before  them  to  justify  abrogating  sovereign  immunity. 
Well,  the  Copyright  Remedy  Clarification  Act  is  different  in  a  meaningful  way. 
The  Copyright  Office  has  done  a  lengthy  study  of  why  this  was  necessary  and  that  is  part 
of  the Congressional  Record .  There  also  was  testimony  from  the  Register  of  Copyrights 
explaining  why  this  was  especially  necessary  for  copyright.  That  legislative  history 
doesn’t  exist  for  patent  or  for  trademark.  False  advertising,  I  guess,  was  the  other  case. 
Register  Oman  was  working  on  that  at  the  time,  and  he  actually  did  look  at  all  of 
the  infringement  that  had  happened  before  1990.  So  not  only  do  you  have  this  record  of 
post-1990  infringement,  but  you  have  this  study.  Why  did  we  do  it?  It  was  because  we 
already  saw  all  of  these  infringements. 
Again,  I  don’t  know  what  a  new  Court  would  do  with  that.  Maybe  they  would 
say,  “Oh,  well,  we’ll  just  throw  it  into  the  same  bucket  as  everything  else,”  which 
sometimes  they  do  with  IP  without  looking  at  the  differences.  But  I  think  that  is  a 
meaningful  distinction  for  copyright  over  the  other  disciplines. 
PROF.  OMAN:  The  study  was  done  before  the  advent  of  the  digital  age  with  the 
Internet  and  infringements  being  so  cheap,  fast,  and  easy.  The  multiplication  of  the 
infringements  has  increased  exponentially,  and  in  my  view,  there  should  be  some  liability. 
I  should  note  that  bills  have  been  drafted.  Two  senators  are  standing  by  ready  to 
introduce  them,  but  obviously  they  won’t  act  until  we  get  word  from  the  Supreme  Court 
one  way  or  the  other.  The  bill  is  very  clear  in  stating  that  this  would  not  expose  the  states 
to  liability  for  a  good-faith  fair-use  argument  or  for  innocent  infringement.  It  would  be 
for  direct,  willful  infringement  that  they  would  be  exposed  to  if  the  legislation  were 
adopted. 
MR.  CARSON:  I’m  just  curious.  Would  this  draft  bill  include  statutory  damages 
or  just  compensatory? 
PROF.  OMAN:  Statutory  damages  were  not  taken  off  the  table. 
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PROF.  BARTOW:  Is  there  any  economic  data  about  any  of  this  that  suggests  how 
much  in  lost  royalties  might  be  at  issue  and  in  which  states,  looking  at  the  differences 
among  states?  I  was  wondering  as  I  was  sitting  here,  if  the  private  schools  wind  up 
subsidizing  the  public  schools  if  it’s  academic  material  and  that’s  your  only  market.  I 
wonder  if  there  are  any  studies  of  that. 
PROF.  OMAN:  I’m  not  aware  of  any  economic  studies.  But  the  states  that  have 
voluntarily  agreed  to  waive  their  sovereign  immunity  probably  are  pretty  clean  on  the 
subject,  whereas  those  that  have  refused  to  waive  have  a  tradition  or  a  habit  of 
infringement. 
MR.  SIMMONS:  If  you  look  at  the  cases  that  are  raising  this  issue,  what  was 
done  is  basically  taking  a  work  that  was  submitted  and  giving  it  out  to  everyone  for  free. 
In  terms  of  the  economic  effect  on  those  authors,  I  think  that’s  pretty  straightforward. 
But  it’s  not  just  books  or  articles.  We  litigated  a  software  case  against  the  State  of 
Oregon.  When  Obamacare  was  enacted,  the  State  of  Oregon  hired  Oracle  to  do  their  work 
in  implementing  the  system  there  and  there  was  a  dispute  over  the  agreement.  There  was 
state  court  action  and  there  was  federal  action.  
Oracle  sued  for  copyright  infringement,  saying,  “You  waived  in  the  agreement,” 
and  Oregon  said,  “No,  we  didn’t.”  So  one  of  the  issues  was:  is  there  a  waiver;  but,  if  there 
isn’t,  also  are  there  Copyright  Remedy  Clarification  Act  issues? 
After  our  opening  brief  was  filed  and  various  people  came  in  saying,  “Yes, 
there’s  no  protection  for  the  State  of  Oregon,”  the  case  ended.  The  parties  reached  a 
resolution.  We  don’t  know  where  that  would  have  led. 
But  it’s  not  just  books;  it’s  not  just  photographs  or  articles;  it’s  software  and 
anything  else  that  a  state  or  a  state  actor  wants  to  use. 
MR.  TEPP:  It’s  reasonable  to  ask  questions  about  the  economic  impact.  Your 
suggestion  is  an  interesting  angle.  I  would  think  it  would  be  rather  difficult  to  have 
complete  data  when  you  factor  in  undetected  infringements  and  infringements  that  were 
detected  but  no  action  taken  because  of  futility,  recognizing  the  current  state  of  the  law. 
I  mentioned  the  GAO  report  earlier.  For  what  it’s  worth,  when  I  was  at  the 
Copyright  Office  I  worked  with  our  folks  inside  the  Office  to  come  up  as  best  we  could 
with  the  information  about  how  often  states  and  state  instrumentalities  register 
copyrights,  and  that  information  is  in  the  GAO  report.  Not  surprisingly,  it  was  quite 
substantial. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  Yes,  it  would  be  labor-intensive.  But  I  know  at  the  University 
of  New  Hampshire  —  and  I  actually  visited  Florida  last  fall,  another  state  school  —  that 
you  have  to  submit  your  syllabi  and  then  they  become  a  state  record.  So  one  way  to 
detect  it  would  be  to  look  at  the  syllabi.  We  have  required  information  that  has  to  be  in 
the  syllabi,  including  the  books  we  use,  the  materials  we  use.  You  could  compile  that. 
MR.  TEPP:  That  covers  potential  infringement  in  the  context  of 
instructional-related  activities.  What  if  the  university  has  unlicensed  software  on  some  of 
its  systems,  a  handout  that  has  unlicensed  images  on  it  that  may  not  be  reflected  in  the 
syllabus?  
PROF.  BARTOW:  But  it’s  a  start. 
MR.  TEPP:  It’s  something.  I’m  not  opposed  to  trying  to  find  out  what  we  can. 
My  point  is  simply  that  trying  to  get  complete  data  there  is  going  to  be  very  challenging. 
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MR.  GRATZ:  It  might  be  interesting  to  look  at.  I  suspect  that  most  states  have 
very  similar  needs  when  it  comes  to  many  types  of  software,  and  software  companies 
probably  possess  information  on  (a)  which  states  have  waived  and  (b)  which  states  pay 
how  much  for  how  many  licenses.  That  might  be  another  way  of  taking  a  look  at  the 
magnitude  and  seeing  whether  there  are  any  states  that  blatantly  pirate  software  or 
whether  everybody  more  or  less  acts  the  way  they  ought  to. 
MR.  BARTELT:  To  that  point,  I  am  curious.  This  is  for  both  Ralph  and  Steve. 
Since Chavez  or  since  this  GAO  report,  has  the  conduct  changed  significantly,  the  types 
of  infringement,  what’s  going  on,  what’s  happening? 
I  think Allen  was  the  case  in  North  Carolina  where  there  was  a  video  of  a  pirate 
ship  under  water  and  the  state  had  passed  a  law  placing  it  in  the  public  domain.  Are  what 
the  states  are  doing  in  these  recent  instances,  these  165  examples  that  you  have,  different 
in  some  way  than  what  maybe  we  saw  in  the  past  when  you  were  working  on  this  lovely 
Copyright  Office  report  or  the  GAO  report? 
PROF.  OMAN:  Want  me  to  sign  it?  [Laughter] 
MR.  BARTELT:  This  is  actually  a  copy  I  poached  from  Maria  Strong. 
PROF.  OMAN:  Does  she  want  me  to  sign  it? 
MR.  CARSON:  If  anyone  has  a  copy,  Ralph  will  be  happy  to  sign  copies  after 
this  panel. 
PROF.  OMAN:  If  I  may  mention  one  more  point,  one  of  the  shortcomings  of  the 
1990  report  by  the  Copyright  Office  is  that  we  sent  out  questionnaires  to  the  states.  Some 
of  them  responded  and  some  of  them  didn’t. 
MR.  CARSON:  Amazing.  They  didn’t  respond. 
PROF.  OMAN:  They  didn’t  put  themselves  on  report,  surprisingly. 
MR.  TEPP:  Nick,  to  try  to  answer  your  question,  I  haven’t  been  tracking  this 
closely  in  the  last  fifteen  or  twenty  years,  but  even  within  months  after  the  1999  decisions 
we  were  already  getting  at  least  anecdotal  evidence  of  people  coming  to  us  and  saying, 
“We  had  an  infringement  case  against  such-and-such  state  instrumentality.  We  sent  a 
cease-and-desist  letter  and  we  had  a  meeting  with  them.  They  waved  the  Supreme  Court’s 
decision  in  our  face  and  said,  ‘This  meeting  is  over.’”  That  was  discouraging. 
MR.  CARSON:  We  have  almost  ten  minutes  on  this  panel  on  U.S.  Copyright 
Developments,  and  it  sounds  like  we  may  have  pretty  much  talked  over  these  issues  that 
have  been  raised  so  far.  
I  know  Ann  has  some  issues  that  she  wants  to  raise. 
MS.  BARTOW:  Yes. 
MR.  GRATZ:  Do  we  have  other  questions  on  the  previous  topics?  
MR.  CARSON:  Does  anyone  else  have  any  questions  or  comments  on  the  topics 
we  have  been  talking  about  so  far?  Okay,  let’s  get  to  that  one  person,  and  then  we’ll  go  to 
Ann. 
QUESTION  [Dimitrios  Moscholeas,  Law  Office  of  Dimitrios  Moscholeas]: 
Thank  you.  Two  questions.  One  is  regarding  if  you  happen  to  know  the  top  three  worst 
state  infringers,  I’m  just  curious,  and  the  three  states  that  are  really  good  so  far. 
The  other  is  for  Josh.  Josh,  regarding  choreography,  in  your  view  should  it  be  a 
mixed  quantitative/qualitative  criterion,  not  just  the  number  of  steps  involved  but  also  the 
 
Verbatim  Transceedings,  Inc. 714/960-4577 
/
20 
        Session  9A 
 
 
quality,  like  something  more  than  just  simple  steps?  Should  that  be  the  right  approach  for 
choreography? 
MR.  SIMMONS:  In  terms  of  choreographic  works,  the  Copyright  Office  says 
that  individual  dance  steps  are  off  the  table  completely;  simple  dance  routines  are  also  off 
the  table. 
One  of  the  interesting  things  we  looked  at  —  again  because  I  like  to  relate  it 
back,  this  relates  to  copyright  modernization  —  is  the  Copyright  Office  has  started 
putting  out  their  refusal  decisions  or  reversing  refusals,  the  letters  from  the  appeal  board. 
One  of  the  things  that  we  cited  to  was  an  example  of  a  dance  by  Pilobolus,  which 
is  a  modern  dance  company.  Pilobolus  tried  to  register  a  dance  where  they  form  a  flower, 
and  there’s  a  lengthy  description  of  it  in  the  letter.  The  Copyright  Office  said  no.  The 
Copyright  Office  said,  “This  is  too  simple.  These  are  creating  a  geometric  shape,  which 
also  is  not  usually  protectable,  and  it’s  just  simple  dance  steps.” 
To  answer  your  question,  I  think  that  if  it  is  just  a  dance  step,  which  is  what  we 
were  really  dealing  with  in  our  cases,  that’s  just  off  the  table.  In  terms  of  simple  dance 
routines,  the  Copyright  Office  has  given  us  quite  good  guidance  on  what  they’ll  protect. 
But  I  haven’t  had  to  draw  those  lines  because  we’ve  only  had  these  cases  and  we  haven’t 
heard  from  the  other  side  how  they  would  defend  their  copyrightability  argument. 
PROF.  OMAN:  The  point  I  want  to  make  is  related  to  Josh’s  answer.  The 
copyright  law  talks  about  compilation  authorship;  it  talks  about  “selection,” 
“coordination,”  and  “arrangement.”  It’s  my  understanding  that  coordination  was  added 
specifically  to  cover  choreography:  the  coordination  of  one  step  to  another  step  to  another 
step  which  requires  expert  manipulation  that  rises  to  a  level  of  artistry  that  can  be 
protected  by  copyright. 
In  the  other  categories,  in  compilation,  selection,  or  arrangement,  it’s  very  clear 
in  the Compendium  that  there  has  to  be  more  than  two  or  three  items  to  constitute 
sufficient  authorship  to  qualify  for  copyright  for  an  arrangement,  for  instance.  Therefore, 
by  analogy,  there  have  to  be  two  or  three  or  four  or  five  or  six  distinct  steps  in  the 
choreographic  work  to  qualify  for  copyright  protection. 
MR.  SIMMONS:  What’s  interesting  about  that  distinction  is  if  it’s  a  selection, 
arrangement,  and  coordination  copyright,  then  the  infringement  needs  to  be  of  the 
selection,  arrangement,  and  coordination.  You  can’t  pluck  something  out  of  the  middle  of 
that  and  say,  “Aha!  You  used  part  of  it,  and  you’re  infringing.” 
We  didn’t  get  into  this  in  my  presentation,  but  on  the  Backpack  Kid  who  did  the 
floss  dance,  he  actually  does  have  a  registration  on  a  work  that  has  the  floss  in  it.  It’s  a 
longer  work  with  many  different  dance  steps,  and  the  Copyright  Office  actually  did 
register  that.  It’s  called  the  “Flossin  Dance,”  but  it  is  a  much  longer  work  with  a  lot  of 
different  moving  parts.  Again,  because  they  were  paying  attention,  they  noted  that  the 
individual  dance  steps  were  not  protected;  it  is  just  the  entire  thing.  
But  the  reason  that  that  is  not  an  issue  in  our  case  is  there  is  no  allegation  that  the 
entire  set  of  dance  steps  was  copied;  it  is  just  that  one  movement.  Again,  you  can’t  just 
pluck  that  out  and  say,  “Aha!  I  have  a  copyrightable  work  and  you  copied  this  one 
unprotectable  element.”  It  has  to  be  the  whole  selection  and  arrangement. 
MR.  CARSON:  With  respect  to  the  other  question,  I’m  guessing  we  don’t  have  a 
list  of  which  states  have  been  naughty  and  which  states  have  been  nice.  Is  that  fair  to  say? 
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PROF.  OMAN:  That  would  be  bad  politically  for  the  senators  who  are  proposing 
the  legislation. 
MR.  CARSON:  We  are  going  to  go  to  Ann  now  because  we’re  running  out  of 
time. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  Has  anyone  here  litigated  a  203  termination  rights  case? 
[No  response] 
Nobody.  
I  have  been  thinking  a  lot  about  termination  rights.  I  teach  copyright  law  in  many 
different  contexts,  and  it’s  a  misery  to  teach  the  termination  rights  to  the  students,  even 
the  really  smart  students.  It  is  really  hard  to  go  through  the  problem  sets  and  other  things. 
Some  of  the  first  few  cases  —  I  don’t  know  if  you’re  aware  of  them  —  that  have 
been  moving  through  the  system  —  any  work  with  a  long  tail  the  content  owners  are  just 
fighting  tooth  and  nail,  particularly  in  the  music  industry,  to  try  to  prevent  this.  
In  the YMCA  case ,  the  guy  who  was  with  the  Village  People  case  got  so  many 18
surprises  —  that  poor  guy.  First,  I  think  it  was  a  surprise  that  he  was  even  a  co-author; 
I’m  not  sure;  I  haven’t  nailed  that  down.  Then  he  had  to  go  through  the  proceeding  to 
determine  if  a  joint  author  could  exercise  termination.  And  then  he  went  through  all  the 
litigation.  Ultimately,  the  content  owner  behaved  so  bad  that  he  got  attorney  fees,  which 
was  a  good  thing.  But  it  went  on  a  long  time.  The  punchline  of  that  case  is  the  only 
reason  the  guy  (a)  knew  that  he  had  termination  rights  and  (b)  decided  to  hold  fast  and 
fight  it  all  the  way  through  is  his  wife  is  an  attorney.  Had  it  not  been  for  that,  he  wouldn’t 
have  had  any  idea. 
There  are  many  people,  not  just  musicians,  in  his  generation  that  have  no  idea 
what’s  out  there.  I  don’t  know  if  anyone  here  has  a  role  in  trying  to  communicate  or 
educate  people  about  that,  because  I  guess  if  you  represent  the  content  owner,  you’d  like 
to  kind  of  keep  it  on  the  QT.  I  don’t  know. 
Reactions?  That’s  my  best  bomb-throwing  for  Hugh. 
MR.  CARSON:  Amanda,  you’ve  got  a  response  on  that  point?  Great. 
PARTICIPANT  [Amanda  Denton,  Mitchell  Williams  Law  Firm]:  I’m  in  private 
practice.  This  is  only  really  tangential  to  your  question,  but  it  comes  up  for  me  in  practice 
when  I’m  advising  about  drafting  agreements  for  work  for  hire  and  trying  to  instruct  very 
immature  contracting  entrepreneurs  about  the  importance  of  the  work-for-hire  provision 
so  that  they  don’t  come  up  against  the  termination  problem  down  the  road.  It  is  hard  for 
them  to  even  imagine  such  success  that  thirty-five  years  from  now  that  would  be  even  a 
concern.  There  are  some  limited  ways  to  explain  why  work  for  hire  is  important,  and 
YMCA  is  one  of  the  cases  that  I  try  to  use,  to  little  effect. 
MR.  CARSON:  Jacqueline,  did  you  have  a  comment  as  well? 
PARTICIPANT  [Jacqueline  Charlesworth,  Alter,  Kendrick  &  Baron,  LLP,  New 
York]:  Yes,  I  wanted  to  respond  quickly.  There  are  many,  many  termination  notices 
served  for  musical  works  and  sound  recordings.  The  vast  majority  are  not  litigated  and 
the  rights  are  renegotiated.  So  I  think  there  isn’t  a  huge  amount  of  case  law  out  there  — 
there’s  some.  The  reality  is  that  the  right  is  important  and  it  is  exercised  not  infrequently. 
18  Scorpio  Music  S.A.  v.  Willis,  No.  11CV1557  BTM  RBB,  2012  WL  1598043  (S.D.  Cal. 
May  7,  2012). 
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I  don’t  want  to  say  everyone  knows  about  it  and  everyone  is  fully  versed  on  it,  so  I  think 
education  is  good. 
But  typically  what  happens  is,  if  it  is  an  active  catalog  and  it  is  valuable,  the 
notice  is  served,  and  then  it  does  what  it  is  supposed  to  do,  which  is  it  offers  the 
songwriter,  say,  an  opportunity  to  renegotiate  the  rights,  and  a  lot  of  that  is  done  in  a 
fairly  amicable  way  —  not  always,  but  often. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  In  addition  to  the  authors  who  are  not  aware  of  their 
termination  rights,  the  next  group  of  people  who  need  to  be  educated  are  trust  and  estate 
lawyers. 
PARTICIPANT  [Ms.  Charlesworth]:  They  do  know.  They  are  involved,  too.  They 
serve  notices  as  well. 
PROF.  BARTOW:  They  need  to  take  copyright  law. 
PARTICIPANT  [Ms.  Charlesworth]:  Yes.  Actually,  the  intersection  of  trusts  and 
estates  and  copyright,  I  agree,  is  an  interesting  area.  But  there  are  trusts  and  estates,  and 
family  members  become  involved,  and  you  will  often  have  kids,  and  sometimes  you  get 
the  50  percent  majority  and  sometimes  not.  There  are  a  lot  of  interesting  fact  patterns  that 
come  up  in  the  termination  context.  
But  the  law  does  seem  to  be  functioning.  I  think  there  are  a  lot  of  gaps,  as  we 
know,  in  the  statute,  and  some  of  the  legal  questions  that  come  up  are  interesting  and 
sometimes  hard  to  answer.  The  termination  industry  is  happening,  but  a  lot  of  it  is  behind 
the  scenes. 
MR.  SIMMONS:  The  estate  point  is  interesting  because  a  lot  of  the  cases  we 
have  seen  involved  the  estates  bringing  the  suits.  When  we’ve  seen  this  come  up,  the 
original  authors  may  be  comfortable  renegotiating  because  they  have  ongoing 
relationships  in  the  industry. 
When  you  then  move  down  to  the  heir,  sometimes  they  don’t  have  the 
relationships  and  don’t  want  to  maintain  the  relationship  inside  of  the  industry,  so  they 
are  willing  to  throw  bombs  and  bring  lawsuits  and  the  rest  of  it.  We  see  that  not  just  in 
termination  but  in  other  kinds  of  cases,  where  there  are  industry  norms  that  people  are 
used  to  and  relationships  that  they  want  to  keep,  and  then  their  heirs,  people  from  outside 
the  industry,  sort  of  go,  “Hey,  wait  a  minute.  I  want  my  money.”  That  is  not  necessarily 
the  only  compensation  people  get  from  being  part  of  these  industries  and  having  these 
relationships. 
MR.  CARSON:  With  that,  our  time  is  up.  We  have  a  break  for  twenty-five 
minutes.  For  those  who  want  to  stick  around,  Josh  will  lead  us  in  a  performance  of  the 
floss  dance.  [Laughter] 
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